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Abstract: As the microfinance industry becomes more competitive,
microfinance institutions (MFIs) increasingly seek access to credit
bureaus and credit information agencies. The growing number of
microfinance providers in the market results in borrowers having
more access to loans, which can lead to client overindebtedness and
default. By sharing client information with each other and by using
credit bureau information on client history and indebtedness, MFIs
facing competition can reduce their credit risk and avoid unnecessary
losses. While the growing interest in credit bureaus for microfinance
is global, to date, few countries have credit unions and even fewer
include microfinance clients in their databases. However, technological
advances have lowered the costs of maintaining a large database of
information and have made the cost of operating a credit bureau more
financially feasible. Credit bureaus are now sprouting up, particularly
in Latin America, and microfinance institutions are vying for access
to their databases of information. This article presents the case of
Bolivia, a country which has experienced extreme competition among
microfinance providers, and which is now making efforts to integrate
microfinance clients into its credit information system.

Introduction
Microfinance in Bolivia has gone from one extreme to
another—from low-income clients having very little access
to loans in the 1980s to some microfinance clients now overly
indebted. Twenty-three percent of BancoSol’s clients currently
have outstanding loans with other institutions, and many of
these clients are overly indebted. The Bolivian credit bureau has
played a key role in allowing regulated lenders to avoid granting loans to overly indebted clients and clients who have
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defaulted on loans in the past. This service to the financial institutions and to their clients also benefits the general public.
Regulated financial institutions appreciate the service provided by the credit bureau because it improves their ability to
make loan decisions. Knowing a client’s credit history facilitates the institution’s assessment of the credit risk involved,
i.e., the chance that a client may default on a loan. Clients with
past performance problems indicate a higher risk. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) address this risk by either rejecting
the loan request or by creating terms that better fit the risk
profile of the borrower.
The public credit bureau benefits clients too because it
reduces their chances of becoming overly indebted. Clients
often don’t know how much debt they can handle. Financial
institutions use the information contained in the credit
bureau’s database to verify the client’s current level of indebtedness. The institution takes this debt into account when calculating clients’ repayment ability. Even though many
microfinance institutions now accept guaranties, the objective
is always to avoid overindebtedness. Regulated MFIs are in the
lending business for the long-term and therefore aim to
develop long-lasting client relationships.
The Bolivian credit bureau is a public asset because it
helps to stabilize the financial sector, which influences the
general state of the economy. The existence of the credit
bureau has helped to improve repayments from institutions in
liquidation, including Banco Cochabamba, BancoSur, and
Banco Internacional de Desarrollo. Clients know that they
will have difficulties accessing a loan from another financial
institution in the future if they don’t repay their existing loan,
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even if the existing loan was borrowed from an institution
that no longer exists.
Many microfinance institutions are not regulated and do
not have access to the superintendency’s credit bureau to assess
client indebtedness. Microfinance providers have sought to
overcome this and other limitations of the superintendency’s
credit bureau by creating informal systems for information
sharing and by tapping other sources of public information. In
addition, the superintendency is researching the possibility of
expanding its services to unregulated microfinance institutions
in the near future.

The Bolivian Superintendency’s Credit Bureau
Since 1988, the Bolivian Superintendency has operated the
only legal credit bureau in Bolivia. Through this public credit
bureau, the superintendency requires that all regulated financial institutions share information on their clients’ indebtedness and repayment histories on a monthly basis. The
superintendency currently regulates seventy regulated financial
institutions, including thirteen banks, thirteen credit unions,
seven Private Financial Funds (PFFs), 1 and a number of cooperatives. The superintendency’s database contains information
on approximately one million clients. 2 The credit bureau
receives approximately five thousand inquiries per day, which is
accessible 24 hours per day, 365 days per year via the Intranet.
The database tracks 140 different variables on the regulated financial institutions’ clients and their guarantors. The
superintendency uses this information for two purposes.
First, it uses it to review the state of the economy and the
health of local financial institutions. This review helps the
superintendency determine its inspection visits schedule; priority is given to those institutions with indications of poor
portfolio quality and other internal operational problems.
Second, it uses the information for its credit bureau, for
which approximately 30 of the 140 variables of information
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are shared with regulated financial institutions to support
loan decisions.

How It Works
The credit bureau is a useful tool for those regulated institutions
that have access to its database. Financial institutions can use
the Bolivian credit bureau not only to check a client’s credit
history, which facilitates more informed loan decision-making,
but they can also use the information to avoid client
overindebtedness, a growing problem in Bolivia in the past two
years. The financial institution’s process of participation in
the data collection and information sharing includes the
following steps:
Collecting client information. At the end of each month,
the financial institutions compile financial statements and
information, including the names, identification card numbers,
balances owed, guaranty amounts, and amounts in arrears,
indicating the amount of time past due for all loan clients. The
institutions do not share where the client lives, the type of
business owned or where the business is located. The omission
of this information reduces the chance that the database will be
used by competitors to steal clients.
Submitting data. In addition to submitting financial statements, regulated financial institutions must report client information to the superintendency within ten days of the end of
each month. These clients include both individuals and
corporate entities. Most of the institutions send in their information via Intranet. A few financial institutions that don’t
have access to the Internet send in computer diskettes with the
information. This method of submission is the most prone to
problems, such as the late arrival of the information or the
diskette becoming demagnetized and therefore unreadable.
When the superintendency receives the information, it runs
an automated validation of figures and balances, and checks for
logical consistency. Once the superintendency validates the
information, it consolidates it into the central database.
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Sharing information. Client information is compiled and
shared in three ways: (1) on line, (2) by download, and (3) in
written reports. The Bolivian credit bureau has an Intranet system whereby participating financial institutions can access
information on all clients in the database. It also has a public
web site, located at http://www.supernet.bo. Checking client
histories electronically is the most expensive to the financial
institution because it requires high-level telecommunications
and computer operating systems. Accessing client information
online from the Intranet offers the most up-to-date and complete information to aid the institutions in making educated
lending decisions. A less expensive alternative is for institutions
to download the information in batch overnight. This method
of checking the database is less time-consuming, since the
downloaded database can be quickly reviewed without the
delays of finding a web page. In addition to these two methods
of sharing information, the superintendency also sends the
financial institutions a summarized hard copy of all its clients’
information. This report is not used to approve loans, but it
acts as a control by which institutions can check if their information is correctly recorded. Caja Los Andes’ credit committees use this report to review and assess credit ratings.
Using the information for loan decisions. The superintendency
requires financial institutions to use the information in the credit
bureau’s database to make loan decisions. (Managers from
BancoSol, Caja Los Andes, and PRODEM reported that they
would use the credit bureau even if it were not a legal requirement.) This requirement applies to all loan clients, including new
loans and renewals, individual loans, and loans made to solidarity group members. However, the credit check is only the first
step of the loan decision process, which also entails a thorough
review of the client’s repayment capacity.
For each loan decision, the superintendency requires that
financial institutions obtain written permission from clients to
check their credit histories. The superintendency regularly
checks that financial institutions access only the database to
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clear potential clients who have granted them permission by
manually comparing the written permission with the list of
names accessed. If the superintendency finds that an institution
violated this restriction, it will send either a written letter of
warning or fine the institution.
To make an inquiry online, the financial institution enters
a user name and password. Then, using the client’s name or
identification number, the employee can look up the client’s
credit history. Table 1 displays the online format of the
Bolivian credit bureau’s database for a fictitious client.
Table 1. Sample Inquiry into Bolivia’s Credit Bureau Database
Direct Loan History
Financial
Institution

Qualiﬁcation
Status

Active
Loans

Late>
30 days

Past Due
In Legal
(30–90 days) process
(90+ days)

Available Written
Credit Line
off

BancoSol

1

200,000

0

0

0

Total

0

0

200,000

Loan Guarantee History
Financial
Institution

Qualiﬁcation
Status

Active
Loans

Late
Past due
In Legal
Available
30 days (30–90 days) Process
Credit Line
(90+ days)

Written
off

Total

The client displayed in Table 1 has one outstanding loan
with BancolSol with a remaining balance of 200,000 Bolivianos.
The superintendency records all transactions in Bolivianos. If the
loan was issued in dollars, then the value in Bolivianos is updated
monthly using current exchange rates. If another individual guaranteed the loan, then the guarantor’s information shows on the
same screen directly below the borrower’s information. The
qualification status of “1” indicates that this person has no current repayment problems. Table 2 displays the rankings used by
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the Superintendency for qualification status. The superintendency discourages regulated financial institutions from
lending to borrowers with a qualification ranking of “4” or “5,”
those with loans in legal processes or written off, by requiring
that institutions provision 100 percent of those loans.
Table 2—Bolivia’s Qualification Status Rankings
Qualiﬁcation Status

Indicates

1

No problems, normal active loans and
up to ﬁve days past due (0–5 days late)

2

Potential problems (6–30 days late)

3

Unsatisfactory (31–60 days late)

4

Doubtful (61–90 days late)

5

Write offs (over 90 days late and
in legal processes)

Most microfinance institutions lend primarily to clients
with qualification rankings of “1” or “2.” The lender might
require a higher level of guarantee on a loan or reduce the loan
amount for a client with a ranking of “2” than for a client
with a “1” ranking. MFIs might lend to clients with a qualification status of “3” on an existing loan depending on the circumstances that caused the late payments, however, they will
usually require that the borrower pay off the loan before issuing a new one. If the client claims he or she has already repaid
a loan that still shows on the credit bureau report, the MFI will
ask the client to show receipts or acquire a written letter from
the former lender indicating proof of payment.
Institutions that want to limit their time online can conduct
batch inquiries, combining information up to fifty clients. In
this case, the financial institution creates the inquiry in Notepad
or another basic software program that operates in ASCII format. The institution then cuts and pastes the ASCII file into a
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software program that simulates the online system and sends it
by mail to the superintendency. The superintendency provides
the software to institutions with no Internet access.

Cost Issues
The Bolivian credit bureau offers services to financial institutions
that help increase their operational efficiency by improving their
loan decision processes, which can lead to higher profits. In light
of this fact, the Bolivian credit bureau attempts to cover its costs
by passing on the expenses to the primary beneficiaries—the regulated financial institutions.
Costs to run the credit bureau. The superintendency estimates
that its costs to set up the credit bureau were approximately
$98,000. Maintenance costs are currently about $31,000 per year,
not including staff time. Table 3 details the items involved in
these expense estimates.
Table 3. Setup and Operational Costs of the Bolivian Credit Bureau
Setup Items
Computer
equipment
Software—
Lotus Notes
Total

Setup Costs
$90,000

Monthly Maintenance
Telecommunications

Maintenance Costs
$31,000

8,000

$98,000

$31,000

Costs to the financial institution. There is no per consultation
cost for checking a client’s history in the credit bureau’s database. The cost is covered in the annual fee that financial institutions pay to the superintendency for regulation and supervision.
The annual fee equals 1/1000 of the financial institution’s total
assets. With this method of calculating regulatory fees, traditional financial institutions in essence cross-subsidize the
expenses related to credit bureau service of microfinance institutions. MFIs tend to have a smaller asset base than traditional
52

Volume 3 Number 1

Client Information Sharing in Bolivia

institutions but a larger volume of clients. Therefore, MFIs tend
to pay a lower annual fee and yet make a greater number of
inquiries to the credit bureau every year. Nonetheless, the regulatory fees cover many more expenses than just those related to
the credit bureau, and in general, it is more costly to supervise
larger banks than small microfinance institutions.

Limitations
The Bolivian public credit bureau’s database is not complete. It
does not include microfinance NGO clients and offers only
limited information on regulated financial clients’ histories.
The current system tries to meet all of the superintendency’s
needs in one database, which tracks all the variables necessary
for every type of loan, including consumer, microfinance, and
housing loans. Because of its sheer size and the volume of
information, the credit bureau database is difficult to use for all
the potential purposes it could serve.
Failure to include clients of nonregulated lenders. As mentioned earlier, the superintendency’s credit bureau tracks only
information on loans issued by one of its regulated financial
institutions. The superintendency does not regulate microfinance NGOs and foundations, so their loan clients are not
included in the database. The Superintendent estimates that
approximately 120,000 loan clients are not included in the database. Some cooperatives do not fall under the superintendency’s
supervision, and no microfinance NGOs are included in the
credit bureau. Therefore, 11 percent of all loan clients in
Bolivia are not tracked by the credit bureau, and if one of those
clients wants to take a loan from a regulated institution, he or
she may have difficulty, even with a perfect repayment record.
The same would apply to clients of regulated institutions who
wish to take a loan from an unregulated MFI or cooperative.
Time limits of the data. The superintendency’s database
currently tracks only the past two months of clients’ credit histories. If the client pays off the past-due loan, he or she wipes the
slate clean—there are no long-term impacts on the credit history.
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However, clients who have not yet repaid an overdue loan
remain in the database until the loan is paid off. The credit
bureau system in the United States tracks client information for
seven years, after which past defaults no longer appear in a
client’s credit report. The upside to such a system is that unlike
the Bolivian system, it keeps any past problems with repayment
in the system for several years whether or not the loan was
repaid; the downside is that once seven years have passed, even
outstanding loans are wiped off the record.
Too many variables. The public credit bureau currently contains 140 different variables of information for each loan client
it tracks. While these variables are used for many other purposes than just the credit bureau, this number of variables is
excessive, making it difficult to maneuver the database and use
it in other ways that might be more beneficial. The volume of
information is as much as the current system can handle, which
limits the amount of client history the database tracks.
Consumer lending and microfinance are housed in the same
database. Some consumer lenders have misused information
obtained from the credit bureau. Consumer financiers, such
as ACCESO and Crediágil, began treating microenterprise
clients as consumer loan clients. They eliminated the character and business assessment process and issued loans strictly
on the basis of stated income. These institutions lent freely to
former clients of microfinance institutions, such as BancoSol.
They assumed that if the clients had been good clients of an
MFI in the past, they would be good clients in the future. The
end result was that many of these clients became overly
indebted and defaulted, which caused financial losses for consumer lenders and reduced business for MFIs. In the future,
consumer lenders will only have access to certain pertinent
information in the database, namely the salary of the client it
wishes to serve.
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Future Plans
The superintendency is in the process of addressing these four
limitations by researching alternatives to give microfinance
NGOs access to client histories, as well as ways to make its
database more manageable.
Including NGOs. In April 2000, Bolivia passed an economic
reactivation law, which allows for the creation of a private
credit bureau. The law of banks and financial entities modified
the interpretation of this law to allow the superintendency to
provide partial information from its credit bureau to targeted
private entities, information related strictly to micro and consumer credit. As a result, the superintendency will probably
continue to maintain its database of information but will begin
to share it with and include others, such as microfinance
NGOs and foundations. The Superintendent estimates that
within six months, microfinance NGOs will be able to access
credit bureau information either from the superintendency or
from another private entity. They are now studying the alternatives. One possibility is to allow an NGO, such as FinRural,
to be the broker of information for the microfinance NGOs,
which is discussed later.
Changes to the database. The superintendency is also in the
process of overhauling and revising the database systems. It plans
to reduce the number of variables of client information from 140
to 40 variables in the near future. The superintendency also plans
to separate microcredit from consumer lending, housing, and
commercial. Microfinance will be distinguished from consumer
finance by the source of the client’s income. If the loan is based
on a formal salary, it is a consumer loan; if based on revenue
generated from a microenterprise, it is a microfinance loan. By
creating a separate database for microfinance with fewer variables for each client, the credit bureau’s database will become
much smaller and therefore more manageable. This restructuring
of the database will allow the credit bureau to track more information on each client’s history. The Superintendency’s objective
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is to extend the time period shown in the database to include a
one-year credit history for each client.

Remaining Issues and Challenges
Some other issues and challenges have surfaced related to
Bolivia’s public credit bureau. These are issues that other countries or individuals looking to build a credit bureau system
may want to consider.

Issues
Two interesting consequences resulted from the creation of the
Bolivian credit bureau. First, the current credit bureau system
was structured in such a way that it undermines the solidarity
lending method and has added to the movement away from
group lending toward individual lending in Bolivia. Second,
some financial institutions have used the client information in
credit history files to steal customers from other financial institutions, which has probably fueled the competitive environment in Bolivia.
The undermining of solidarity lending methodology. Bolivia’s
credit bureau undermines the solidarity lending method by
tracking only individuals who defaulted, not their associated
group members. Solidarity lending works well in a strong
economy to reduce credit risk resulting from moral hazard—
the risk of loan loss from clients who have no intent to repay.
However, when there is an economic downturn, as in Bolivia
now, financial difficulties can lead to default for some clients.
The default of one member can result in a domino effect, in
which others drop out of the group instead of repaying the
other member’s loan.
Because Bolivia’s credit bureau does not track this information, a group client can refuse to cover another member’s loan
loss without impacting his or her ability to access a loan from
another institution in the future. As the cohesion of many solidarity groups eroded during the recent economic crisis in
Bolivia, Caja Los Andes took advantage of the situation by
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significantly increasing its client base; it offered individual
loans to former group clients of other MFIs for the first time.
This is not a concern for the superintendency, but it is a concern for solidarity group lenders such as BancoSol, who have
had to review their product lines and make adaptations to
accommodate a changing competitive environment.
Stealing clients. Some MFIs have used information in the
credit bureau to steal each other’s business. For example, when
a credit check reveals that the client has a loan with another
financial institution, one MFI admitted that it often issues the
client a loan sufficient to pay off the other loan and to meet its
additional financing needs. Client stealing is a natural phenomenon of a competitive industry. With or without a credit
bureau, financial institutions always attempt to steal business
from their competitors.

Challenges
The Bolivian credit bureau now faces the challenge of linking
microfinance NGO clients to its database in a cost-effective
manner. In addition, the credit bureau’s database offers a
potential opportunity to use the information to develop a
credit-scoring model for microfinance lending.
Cost-effectively linking NGOs to public credit bureau. It is
too early to assess the value of including microfinance NGO
clients in the credit bureau database. Undoubtedly, including
NGOs will be a costly endeavor, especially when compared
to the potential benefits. The inclusion of microfinance
NGO clients in the credit bureau is not very important to
the well-being of the financial system, given the small average loan size of these 120,000 clients which fall outside the
formal financial system. Given the relative costs of tracking
such information, it may be difficult to convince other countries to include NGO clients, especially if they aim to build
sustainable credit bureaus.
Using information for credit scoring. Once the Superintendency develops a separate database for microfinance
clients’ credit histories, this information could be used to
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develop a credit-scoring model to improve the efficiency of
microfinance lending. Credit scoring is a method by which the
financial institution calculates the risk and makes loan decisions
based strictly on a set of specific criteria that have proven successful to lending decisions in the past. For example, past history information might indicate that 40-year-old clients are less
risky than 22-year-olds and that it’s less risky to lend to bakery
owners than to construction company owners. Criteria, such as
age and business segment, can then be used in making the loan
decision or in setting the terms of the loan, i.e., offering lower
interest rate loans to clients with lower credit risk scores.
BancoSol has enough information to begin to analyze data
to be used later in credit scoring. BancoSol does not now have
the funds to make this investment, but management is interested
in developing a credit-scoring model for microfinance lending
sometime in the near future. Developing a credit-scoring model
is a large undertaking. It would be most efficient if it were developed at the national level, using information contained in the
public credit bureau.

Additional Systems of Information Sharing
Microfinance institutions have found creative ways to overcome some of the limitations of the public credit bureau. MFIs
have developed informal systems and accessed alternative formal systems to acquire information on high-risk clients who
are not tracked in the Superintendency’s database. The three
most common additional systems of client information sharing
among MFIs are blacklists, an informal credit bureau managed
by the association FinRural, and Siprotec, a private entity that
sells public information.

Blacklists
Regulated microfinance institutions compile internal blacklists
and have exchanged them with other MFIs in an effort to track
loan performance problems that do not appear in the credit
bureau’s reports. In particular, MFIs track information on
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clients that have been slow to repay their loans in the past but
have no current repayment problems. Credit risks for these
clients are higher than for those clients who have always repaid
on time. In addition, MFIs that offer solidarity loans, in which
group members co-guarantee loans, track members who have
not covered a member’s default. Finally, MFIs also include on
their blacklists the names of especially difficult customers
whose business they no longer desire.
Internal blacklists. Most MFIs maintain an internal blacklist of bad loan clients, which it uses to reduce the chance the
institution will lend to the same defaulter twice. The first step
in the loan approval process at BancoSol is for the credit officer to check the internal database to see if the loan request is
from a previous customer, and if it is, to assess his or her
repayment history. BancoSol uses this information to determine the credit risk associated with the client based on past
experience. This information can also be helpful in avoiding
repeat lending to bad clients who go to another branch or
region to apply for a loan.
Informal sharing. Several MFIs, including NGOs and regulated institutions, share the names of high-risk loan clients with
each other. The blacklist sharing process is done on an informal
basis each month. There is no agreement that requires an institution to participate in the exchange. However, only those
MFIs that offer client blacklists receive blacklists from the
others. The list contains only the names and identification
numbers of past delinquent loan clients, so it does not violate
clients’ privacy rights. One limitation is that blacklists are
exchanged only on a regional basis, so a delinquent borrower
could move to another region and not be tracked in this system.

The NGOs’ Credit Bureaus
In addition to MFIs sharing their internal blacklists, there has
been another grassroots effort to improve access to information
on bad clients who receive loans outside the formal financial system in Bolivia. FinRural and CIPAME, two nongovernmental
associations, offered credit bureau services to NGOs in Bolivia
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from 1996 to 1998. Operating outside the formal sector, these
associations of NGOs developed databases to track bad loan
clients with information primarily from and for microfinance
NGOs. These services were discontinued due to the limitations
of the system, given that they only provided information on
NGO clients with loan classifications of “4” or “5.”
How it works. FINRURAL and CIPAME operate similarly,
with FINRURAL targeting rural areas and CIPAME focusing
on urban NGOs. Participating NGOs provide the names, identification numbers, and number of days past due of all bad loan
clients. FINRURAL and CIPAME each compile the data and
put it into a database which they share with the same MFIs that
provided the data. Their credit bureaus offer information on
clients in risk categories four and five only, i.e., with loans
over ninety days past due.
Shortcomings. This system of information sharing has had
some limitations. It does not fully meet the needs of microfinance NGOs for client credit history information. The information was incomplete—it did not include bad former clients
of regulated financial institutions. Additionally, there were
inconsistencies in the level of participation of the NGOs
involved. Some NGOs, such as PRODEM, had adequate information systems to ensure accurate and timely data, while others did not. Many NGOs were three months late in their
reporting, which caused PRODEM to begin to report only
clients who were over ninety days past due on their loans. If
the data is not timely or accurate, it is less helpful in reducing
credit risks.
Potential solutions. FINRURAL is currently negotiating
with the superintendency to become the liaison between the
public credit bureau and the NGO credit bureau. The objective
is for FINRURAL to provide NGOs with access to the public
credit bureau and to include NGO information in the superintendency’s credit bureau. This would be a great benefit to
microfinance NGOs that currently have no way to verify how
many of their clients have loans with regulated MFIs. It would
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also be beneficial to regulated microfinance lenders to have a
fuller picture of client indebtedness. This plan is currently
awaiting official approval.
Cost to implement. FINRURAL estimates that it will need
approximately $200,000 to train NGOs and develop their
capacities to contribute timely and accurate data. In addition,
FINRURAL will need $70,000 more to improve the physical
and electronic security of the NGOs’ computer systems.
FINRURAL’s end objective is to increase transparency of
microfinance NGO information and to standardize the NGOs’
financial reporting.

Private Brokers of Public Information
In an effort to make the best loan decisions, some MFIs pay for
access to a database of public information managed by
Siprotec, a private company. As a part of Bolivia’s Department
of Commerce, Siprotec operates much like the Better Business
Bureau in the United States. Siprotec provides records of publicly available data, including penal and civil judgments. For
example, if a potential client has not paid his or her alimony,
that information would be on public record and would be
available from Siprotec. This information can be helpful to
financial institutions, which attempt to assess the borrower’s
character. For example, Siprotec has records of people whose
businesses have failed. While this is not a civil offense, the
information is helpful in assessing the risk involved in lending
to the same person for a new business venture.
Siprotec began operations in 1995 but maintains past history information from 1989 to the present. Siprotec has a database of over two million names, including both individuals and
corporate entities. Eighty percent of all regulated financial
institutions in Bolivia use this service, including BancoSol,
PRODEM, and FIE. While Siprotec has over two hundred subscribers, regulated financial institutions make the majority of
the inquiries.
Costs. Anyone who is willing to pay can access the information from Siprotec. Table 4 displays Siprotec’s prices for its
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services per number of inquiries each month. These perinquiry prices are in addition to the monthly contract fee,
which is $10 for affiliates of the Department of Commerce and
$15 for nonaffiliates. Siprotec’s pricing rewards high volume
customers as the per-inquiry cost drops with an increase in the
total number of inquiries.
Table 4: Siprotec’s Pricing per Monthly Inquiries
Number of Monthly Inquiries
0–4

Cost per Inquiry
Included in contract fee

5–20

$2.00

21–50

$1.80

51–100

$1.70

101+

$1.60

BancoSol began using Siprotec’s services in December
1999. In another region where Siprotec does not have services,
BancoSol uses a similar private company called Datos.
BancoSol uses the Siprotec service only for its small business
lending—for clients requesting loans greater than $30,000. If
the search under a person’s name and identification number
reveals some negative press or a pending civil judgment,
BancoSol will often question the client and conduct a minor
investigation to determine whether it affects the loan decision.
Caja Los Andes is using Siprotec’s database for its larger microfinance clients who request loans over $5,000.
Limitations. In addition to legal announcements, Siprotec
extracts information from newspapers and from other publications. Newspapers often publish only the names of people
involved in an incident without giving a corresponding identification number. With common names this can result in confusion, making it difficult to link a certain instance to the
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proper person. Participating institutions have to be careful not
to use this incomplete information in a way that could offend
potential clients, for example, by accusing them of a wrongdoing they have not committed.
Even though the information is publicly available data, it
seems risky to be the broker of such precarious information.
Siprotec tracks only negative publicity. Nonetheless, no one has
ﬁled a lawsuit against Siprotec to date.

Summary and Conclusions
A host of complementary instruments work together to keep
Bolivia’s ﬁnancial institutions informed about potential customers.
The credit bureau is only part of the network of instruments. Some
parts of this network are the result of the ingenuity of the country’s MFIs, which created ways to learn about borrowers when the
formal system did not accommodate needed information. Other
parts of the system, namely Siprotec, are the results of a healthy
private economy in which information is a valuable asset.
Bolivia is on its way to housing one of the most complete sets
of information on loan clients in the developing world. There are,
however, some limitations of the system, the most salient being
incomplete information or inability to access information. The
Bolivian Superintendency is working to overcome many of these
limitations, including the fact that NGO clients are currently
excluded from the database.
The main challenge in implementing changes is that many will
add to the cost structure more than they will add to the revenue
structure. To provide a system that is sustainable far into the
future, the superintendency must take costs into consideration as it
builds this information network.

Notes
1. A PFF is a nonbank financial intermediary, which is a special regulatory
category the Bolivian Superintendency created specifically to serve small business and microenterprise borrowers.
2. Some of these clients may be repeated in the database.
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